Vol. 44 No. 4 Aug,2017
矿业安全与环保
MINING SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
王金风，常禾雨，霍雪琪，等.煤矿应急协作的演化博弃及仿真分析[J].矿业安全与环保，2017,44(4)：110-114.
文章编号：1008-4495(2017)040110-05 安全管理
煤矿应急协作的演化博奔及仿真分析
王金凤，常禾雨，翟雪琪，冯立杰
第44卷第4期 2017年8月
(1.上海海事大学经济管理学院，上海200120；2.郑州大学管理工程学院，河南郑州450001）
摘要：采用演化博奔论和数值仿真方法，引入应急协作的款援收益、救援收益增量、收益增量分配系数、违约金、机会主义所得及先期成本等效益因子，构建了煤矿应急救授中多主体协作的行为博弃模型。通过分析各效益因子对煤矿企业达成应急协作可能性的影响，探讨了不同企业之间进行协作的策略选择。研究发现：若企业双方不协作时的净机会主义所得均大于协作后的额外救援净收益，此时双方博奔结果均趋向于不协作，反之则双方均趋向于协作；企业双方选择协作的几率与援收益增量、收益增量分配系数的合理配置及违约金呈正相关关系，与先期协作成本和机会主义所得呈负相关关系。
关键词：煤矿；多主体；应急救援；协作；演化博奔；数值仿真
中图分类号：TD77：X92
文献标志码：B
网络出版时间：2017-08-0314：46
网络出版地址:http://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/50.1062.TD.20170803.1446.052.html
Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Emergency
Cooperation ofCoalMines
WANG Jinfeng', CHANG Heyu’, ZHAI Xueqi2, FENG Lijie
(I. School of Economic Managemen, Shanghai Maritime Unirersity, Shanghai 200120, China; 2. School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhour Unieersity, Zhengzhou 450001, China)
Abstract: The behavior game model of multiagent cooperation in the emergency rescue of the coal mine was constructed by using the evolutionary game theory and the numerical simulation method and intrxducing the rescue eamings of the emergency cooperation, the inerement of the rescue earnings, the distribution coefficient of the eaming increment, and the benefit factors such as the liquidated damages, opportunistic gains and upfront costs. Through the analysis of the influence of each benefit factor on the possibility of the coal enterprise reaching the emergency cooperation, the strategy selection of the cooperation among different enterprises was discussed. It was found in research that if the net opportunistic gains of two enterprises from non-cooperation were all greater than the net earnings of the additional rescue from the cooperation, the game results of both sides tented to noncooperation, on the contrary , both sides tented to cooperation; the cooperation selection probability among coal enterprises presented a positive corelation with the increment of the rescue eamings, the reasonable allocation of the distribution coefficient of the eaming increment and the liquidated damages, and a negative correlation with the early cooperation costs and the opportunistic gains.
Keywords : coal mine; multiagent; emergency rescue; coopenation; evolutionary game; mumerical simulation
煤矿复杂的作业环境使其事故时有发生，如何
收稿日期：2016-12-03;2017-04-16修订
基金项目：国家自然科学基金项目（71271194， 71472171)
作者简介：王金风(1963一—)，女，河南焦作人，教授，博士，主要从事煤矿生产物流系统和煤矿安全领域的科研工作
通讯作者：常禾雨（1993一），女，河南郑州人，硕士研究生，研究方向为煤驴生产物流系统和煤媒矿应急教费。E一 mail; 1406987621@ q- com。
.110 · 万方数据
有效开展煤矿事故的应急救援工作日益受到人们的重视。煤矿企业作为灾害事故发生的直接响应者，其应急救援水平决定了教援效率。然而，受诸多条件所限，单个煤矿往往难以承担所有教援工作，煤矿企业之间的应急协作对灾害救援成败至关重要。因此，如何在效益最大化目标下实现煤矿应急救援中多主体协作，以不断提高企业应急救援水平成为煤